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and technologies.  The concept of microeconomic dissonance refers to the fact that the 
underlying microeconomic differences become important when optimal monetary policy 
is analyzed in a nonlinear setting.  The relevance of these concepts is established by 
analysis of optimal steady-state inflation and optimal policy in the stochastic economy 
using a small-scale New Keynesian model.  Microeconomic and financial datasets are 
promising tools with which to overcome the equivalence problem. 
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 1 Introduction
A signi￿cant dilemma for monetary policy advice and model selection arises from the coexistence of
two phenomena: macroeconometric equivalence and microeconomic dissonance. The term macro-
econometric equivalence describes a situation where approaches based on estimating ￿rst-order
approximations of model equilibrium conditions on aggregate time series data do not reveal de-
￿nitively the economy￿ s underlying preference/technology structure. For some positive-economics
applications￿ for example, determining the degree of forward-looking behavior in pricing or spend-
ing decisions￿ the equivalence need not pose major problems. The ￿rst-order properties of the
model may be su¢ cient for answering many positive-economics issues, and no harm may arise from
taking two models to be interchangeable if their ￿rst-order dynamics are isomorphic. Normative
applications, however, raise more concern. Results regarding optimal monetary policy do depend on
the objective functions and production functions in the underlying nonlinear economy. Models that
are equivalent when loglinearized therefore need not be equivalent in what they imply for optimal
monetary policy￿ i.e., for the optimal steady-state in￿ ation rate and the characteristics of e¢ -
cient policy in the stochastic economy. Microeconomic dissonance refers to case where two models
whose structural equations are ￿rst-order equivalent yield di⁄erent optimal monetary policies. This
study considers several strategies for resolving the dilemma posed by the equivalence/dissonance
dichotomy, and o⁄ers conclusions about which strategy should be followed.
The macroeconometric equivalence/microeconomic dissonance issue has received little at-
tention in the modern monetary policy literature. While King and Wolman (1996), for example,
provide a detailed analysis of the sensitivity of the optimal in￿ ation rate to di⁄erent parameter
assumptions in their dynamic general equilibrium model, they do not consider the sensitivity of
the optimal-policy analysis to assuming a di⁄erent (but ￿rst-order equivalent) price-setting speci-
￿cation. This is despite the fact that economists have been well aware of the tendency for macro-
econometric equivalence to arise between models that are far apart in their basic assumptions
about private sector behavior. The notion that di⁄erent rational expectations models may deliver
the same linearized dynamics is of long standing: Sargent (1976) noted that two di⁄erent struc-
1tural models can deliver the same reduced form even when only one model imposes the natural
rate restriction, while Taylor (1997), among others, noted that certain sticky-price and Lucas-style
imperfect-information models deliver similar aggregate supply relationships.
Likewise, instances of microeconomic dissonance, while less prevalent and less appreciated,
underpinned such early contributions to the New Keynesian literature as Caplin and Spulber (1987)
and Ball and Romer (1990). Caplin and Spulber produced a case where price stickiness at the micro
level magni￿es the welfare costs of in￿ ation but produces identical monetary-neutrality results to
those of a ￿ exible-price model. Ball and Romer provided an example of two preference speci￿cations
which, while equivalent in their implications for the degree of aggregate output volatility, lead to
substantially di⁄erent welfare costs from that volatility.
But the taking-o⁄ of New Keynesian models in the last ￿fteen years has not been associ-
ated with a major rea¢ rmation of the dissonance warning. The modern New Keynesian literature
has typically proceeded under the assumption that observationally equivalent models do deliver
similar policy prescriptions. Our conjecture is that this conclusion has been prevalent until now
because it followed from the study of the best-known instance of macroeconometric equivalence
in the New Keynesian literature: that of the Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983) price-setting
speci￿cations.1 Rotemberg and Calvo price schemes have very di⁄erent microfoundations: in the
Rotemberg setup, all ￿rms vary prices each period as a continuous function of marginal cost; in the
Calvo setup, a fraction of ￿rms is selected randomly to adjust prices each period, the remaining
fraction being prohibited to adjust, so price adjustment at the individual-￿rm level is very abrupt
rather than continuous. Yet the two price adjustment speci￿cations deliver equivalent aggregate
Phillips curves (Rotemberg, 1987; Roberts, 1995). There is therefore macroeconometric equivalence
and, given the di⁄erent model underpinnings, the potential for microeconomic dissonance. But the
optimal policies implied by the Calvo and Rotemberg alternatives are not, in fact, very di⁄erent
quantitatively.2 This in￿ uential equivalence result is therefore probably responsible for the wide-
1The Calvo speci￿cation is the most prevalent price-adjustment setup in the New Keynesian literature. Calvo
himself noted that his price-setting scheme was ￿a close relative of the staggered contracts model... of Taylor (1979,
1980).￿
2In fact, Lombardo and Vestin (2007) and Nistico (2007) both demonstrate that second-order welfare functions
(approximated near an e¢ cient steady state) are identical across Calvo and Rotemberg settings. The quantita-
2spread impression that microeconomic dissonance is not an important phenomenon in modern New
Keynesian modeling.
The objects of this study are to dispel this impression and o⁄er strategies to resolve the
resulting dilemma for policymaking and modeling. Our examples of equivalence do not simply
draw on the existing literature; nevertheless, and unlike the aforementioned early New Keynesian
contributions, the focus is on the standard, modern New Keynesian model consisting of the forward-
looking IS and Phillips curves. This focus establishes that important equivalence and dissonance
results emerge even with this widely used benchmark model. This model is, in addition, essentially
a restricted and stripped-down version of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els estimated in such studies as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2005) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). As these medium-scale models
explain actual U.S. and euro area data well, it is realistic to say that the New Keynesian literature
is converging on a DSGE model whose ￿rst-order approximation is a good description of macro-
economic data. It has accordingly become imperative to evaluate the di⁄erences in policy advice
implied by models that are equivalent in their ￿rst-order properties, and also to determine the best
strategy for discriminating between alternative microeconomic underpinnings of such models.
And it deserves emphasis that policy advice cannot typically be determined by the ￿rst-order
dynamics of these models. True, in some positive-economics applications￿ for example, estimation
of Phillips or IS curves, or estimation of the monetary policy rule over a sample period in which
policy has not attempted to maximize household utility￿ only the loglinear approximation of the
model may be needed. But, as noted above, the same is not true for normative applications.
Increasingly, it has become standard to draw out the policy implications of a microfounded model
by determining optimal monetary policy in that model. Even when studying simple monetary policy
rules, it is not unusual to rank these rules according to the extent that they maximize household
utility. This involves evaluation of the nonlinear utility function, or of a second- or higher-order
approximation of utility. Either way, higher-order properties of the model become relevant, and
tive results presented by Lombardo and Vestin further suggest that, even when the steady state is ine¢ cient, the
characteristics of the Ramsey-optimal equilibrium are very similar across the two pricing speci￿cations.
3one cannot draw policy implications immediately from the loglinear representations of the model,
which do not adequately identify these nonlinear elements.
The equivalence of two underpinnings of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is established
below. Each version of the Phillips curve arises from a particular type of strategic complemen-
tarity: ￿rm-speci￿c inputs in one case, and a kinked demand structure in the other. Numerical
results for optimal steady-state in￿ ation are provided that demonstrate the contrasting policy ad-
vice implied by each speci￿cation. Analysis of the aggregate demand side then establishes that
the standard optimizing IS equation is consistent both with orthodox expected-utility preferences
and with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences, and show that the di⁄erent rationalizations for the IS
curve are associated with distinct dynamic properties of optimal monetary policy. The discussion
then turns to an exploration of alternative strategies for dealing with the equivalence/dissonance
combination.
A potential remedy for the equivalence/dissonance problem may be found in econometric
procedures capable of estimating versions of the model based on higher-order approximations (as
in FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2007), or in considering alternative macroeconomic
data. But our conclusion is that a more promising alternative is to deploy datasets not consisting
purely of macroeconomic time series. Microeconomic datasets may be very revealing about eco-
nomic structure. Studies by Bils and Klenow (2004), Angeloni et al (2006), and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) emphasize the value of micro-level information in understanding in￿ ation dynam-
ics. The value of these extra datasets in resolving the equivalence/dissonance dilemma does not
arise inherently from the fact that they are micro data, but that they constitute a di⁄erent type
of data from standard macro series, and so help pinpoint parameters not identi￿able using macro
data. Resolution of macroeconometric equivalence and microeconomic dissonance need not always
involve considering micro data, but will typically involve looking at data beyond macroeconomic
time series. Besides micro data, ￿nancial data are promising candidates in this connection. Asset
price analysis could prove to be similarly revealing about aggregate demand behavior. Taken to-
gether, these alternative datasets provide a discipline on the speci￿cation of models intended for
4monetary policy analysis that macroeconomic data often fail to provide, and in so doing help draw
out more accurate policy implications of a macroeconomic model.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a prototype New Keynesian model,
describing the nonlinear environment, deriving the implied equilibrium conditions, and setting out
the central loglinearized equations. Section 3 considers two real rigidities and their implications for
the slope of the Phillips curve and optimal policy. Section 4 considers strategies for resolving the
equivalence/dissonance dilemma. Section 5 turns the analysis toward the IS equation, focusing on
the IS slope parameter, and detailing the di⁄erent welfare implications of risk-sensitive preferences
compared to the standard expected-utility case. Section 6 discusses the deployment of ￿nancial
data to bring out di⁄erences between macroeconometrically equivalent IS curves. Section 7 provides
concluding remarks.
2 A prototypical New Keynesian model
Below is an outline of a baseline New Keynesian model, which serves as a prototype to which the
subsequent analysis adds variations.














1￿￿ , Ct is an aggregate of the di⁄erent goods consumed, Nt
denotes hours worked, and Mt
Pt is the household￿ s stock of real money balances. All parameters are
positive, with ￿ 2 (0;1) the discount factor. Money is present in the utility function so that, as in
Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004), monetary frictions can be
a factor entering into the determination of optimal steady-state in￿ ation.
Each member of a continuum of ￿rms specializes in producing a particular intermedi-
ate good. These goods are then used as components in the generation of a single, ￿nal con-
sumption good. The production function for an intermediate-good-producing ￿rm j is Yt(j) =
AtKt(j)￿Nt(j)1￿￿ where At is an exogenous productivity shock, Kt(j) and Nt(j) are quantities of
capital and labor services hired by ￿rm j, and ￿ 2 [0;1). Price adjustment for intermediate goods
is subject to the Calvo (1983) apparatus. So each period a fraction 1￿￿ of ￿rms receives clearance
5to reset prices, while a fraction ￿ must hold prices at preexisting levels.
Perfect competition describes the labor market. Capital and labor are mobile across ￿rms,







￿￿1 is output compiled from intermediate goods by the ￿nal-goods producer,
and ￿ > 1: (An alternative aggregation technology is considered in Section 3.) The aggregate capital
stock is ￿xed, implying a market-clearing condition Ct = Yt. An intermediate-good producer faces










As in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), the relative price dispersion that results from
Calvo staggering can be interpreted as an ine¢ ciency that, by misallocating resources across the
intermediate goods sector compared to the ￿ exible-price scenario, depresses the equilibrium level of
￿nal aggregate output. Letting Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(j)dj denote aggregate labor and normalizing aggregate
capital at K = 1, the same misallocation index (￿t) as in Khan, King, and Wolman￿ s model is
relevant, being related to output as Yt = (At
￿t)N1￿￿
t , while Calvo contracts imply that this distortion
follows a ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation,
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)( ~ P￿
t )￿￿ + ￿￿￿
t￿t￿1: (1)
where ~ P￿
t is an index of the relative reset price. As all price change in a particular period comes
from ￿rms acting on a reset signal, there is a relation between the economy￿ s gross in￿ ation rate
and the reset price index:
￿t =
"






A loglinear approximation of the preceding model yields the optimizing IS equation,
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿￿1 [rt ￿ Et￿t+1]; (3)
and the New Keynesian Phillips curve,3
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿mct: (4)
3Hornstein and Wolman (2007) consider the pricing dynamics implied by the fully nonlinear version of this pro-
totype model (i.e., without reliance on the loglinear approximation).
6Here, yt is the log-deviation of output from its steady-state growth path, mct is the log-
deviation of real marginal cost from its steady-state value, and ￿t and rt respectively denote de-
viations of quarterly in￿ ation and the short-term nominal interest rate from their steady-state
values.
The next step is to consider extensions of this prototype model. Each extension involves a
change in economic structure that alters the form of optimal monetary policy. But in no case does
the extension, despite its critical impact on welfare implications of the model, change the IS and
Phillips curves from their loglinearized forms given above￿ the essence of the macroeconometric
equivalence problem.
3 Real rigidities and the slope of the Phillips curve
Let us now consider two types of real rigidity which lower ￿rms￿inclination to increase prices in
the face of a surge in nominal aggregate demand (see e.g. Woodford, 2003, Ch. 3). The two real
rigidities are isomorphic in their implications for loglinear dynamics, but di⁄er in their second-order
repercussions and therefore are associated with di⁄erent welfare results.
3.1 Non-constant elasticity of demand vs. factor speci￿city
Kimball (1995) reformulated the venerable kinked, or variable-elasticity, speci￿cation of goods
demand and combined it with Calvo price setting. This demand structure is the ￿rst real rigidity
contemplated here.
Dotsey and King￿ s (2005) proposal for aggregating across the intermediate goods Yt(j) is
followed here. Continuing to let e Yt(j) =
Yt(j)
Yt denote the share of each intermediate in ￿nal output,
the Dotsey-King aggregator is:
G(e Y ) =
￿
1 +  
h









where ￿ = (￿(1 +  ))=(￿(1 +  ) ￿ 1), and ￿ > 1 is the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) good-j price
elasticity of demand. The pro￿t-maximizing intermediate-good mix is selected, and the aggregator
satis￿es
R 1
0 G(e Yt(j)) dj = 1:
7The parameter   governs curvature of demand for an intermediate ￿rm￿ s product. It yields
the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz constant-elasticity demand function for   = 0. The less standard case
of   < 0 is now considered. This is the setting of quasi-kinked demand. Demand for the ￿rm￿ s
brand is progressively more price-elastic until it reaches a region of virtual satiation; a reduction in
relative price in this region barely stimulates demand. A price increase, on the other hand, runs the
risk of pushing ￿rms away from the moderate-elasticity region into a further region where demand
virtually collapses: see Figure 1. Buyers￿optimal purchasing pattern among the available goods
means that the relative demand for product j can be described as:
e Yt(j) =
1




t +  
i
; (6)
where again e Pt(j) is intermediate good j￿ s relative price. The Lagrange multiplier appearing in
equation (6) is de￿ned as ￿t =
￿R 1
0
e Pt(j)1￿￿(1+ ) dj
￿ 1
1￿￿(1+ ), and so collapses to unity in the Dixit-
Stiglitz case of   = 0. The more general case of   < 0 implies that good j has a ￿ uctuating demand
elasticity, denoted ￿(e Yj) and given by the formula:
￿(e Yj) = ￿
￿




so that the elasticity varies inversely with the proportion of the ￿nal producer￿ s total demand that
is directed at ￿rm j. An intermediate producer￿ s desired markup is ￿(e Yj) ￿
￿(e Yj)
￿(e Yj)￿1; this includes
the familiar case ￿(1) = ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 in the instance of   = 0, but is a function of relative demand
when   is nonzero.
Table 1 presents optimal price-setting conditions for ￿rms in this environment. The table
juxtaposes the Dixit-Stiglitz and kinked-demand cases as represented by the implied desired relative
price e P￿
t and its components Z1t, Z2t, and Z3t.4 The price e P￿
t selected by ￿rms when allowed to
adjust, re￿ ects the need to take into account anticipated ￿ uctuations in the elasticity of demand
(i.e., the ￿t variable) over the period in which the price is expected to be ￿xed.
As detailed in many studies, this model implies a loglinear Phillips curve,
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿￿pmct: (8)
4See Levin, L￿pez-Salido, and Yun (2007a) for a derivation of the law of motion for the relative-price-dispersion
metric in this model environment.
8Table 1: Price-Setting Behavior



















Z1t = Etf ￿￿￿￿￿1
t+1 Z1t+1 g + Ct￿t Z1t = Etf ￿￿￿
￿(1+ )￿1
t+1 Z1t+1 g + Ct￿t￿
￿(1+ )
t
Z2t = Etf ￿￿￿￿
t+1 Z2t+1 g + Ct￿tMCt Z2t = Etf ￿￿￿
￿(1+ )
t+1 Z2t+1 g + Ct￿t￿
￿(1+ )
t MCt
￿t = UC;t = C￿￿
t Z3t = Etf ￿￿￿￿1
t+1 Z3t+1 g + Ct￿t
This is a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve (with marginal cost the driving process)
other than the factorization of the Phillips curve slope into two components. One component
governs nominal rigidity; the other, real rigidity (with the ￿no real rigidity￿case corresponding to
￿ = 1). Where previously the Phillips curve slope ￿ arose simply from nominal rigidity, now the
slope is a composite of the nominal-rigidity parameter ￿p￿ which is a function of the frequency of
price adjustment ￿ and the discount factor ￿: ￿p =
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ ￿ and the real-rigidity parameter
￿ = 1
1￿￿ ; where ￿ is the prototype-model steady-state markup de￿ned above. The demand-
curve kink condition   < 0 implies that ￿ is below unity, approaching zero as   becomes more
negative. It follows that kinked demand for intermediate-￿rm output dampens the reaction of
in￿ ation to ￿ uctuations in marginal cost, putting this model feature in the category of strategic
complementarities discussed in Woodford (2003).
Let us now revert to the assumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz demand structure (  = 0) in order
to consider a di⁄erent source of real rigidity. In our prototype model, the physical capital stock
was constant across periods in aggregate, but not for any individual ￿rm, which could access extra
capital services via a rental market. The environment is now changed to one where a portion of
the intermediate ￿rm￿ s capital stock is of a ￿rm-speci￿c character and so cannot be replenished
by going to the rental market,5 and likewise, let us assume some ￿rm-speci￿c labor (which is to
say, ￿rm-speci￿c human capital). In these circumstances real marginal cost for the generation of
5See Sbordone (2002), Woodford (2003, 2005), and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) for further
discussion of ￿rm-speci￿c capital.
9good-j output can diverge from the economy￿ s average real marginal cost: the ratio g MCt(j) =
MCt(j)=MCt can depart from 1.0. Firm j￿ s production function is now
Yt(j) = At K
￿fk Kt(j)￿vk N
￿fl Nt(j)￿vl: (9)
Here ￿fk > 0, ￿vk > 0, ￿fl > 0, ￿vl > 0, and ￿fk + ￿vk + ￿fl + ￿vl = 1. Overbars denote
immobile production factors. Accordingly ￿f = ￿fl + ￿fk is the fraction of factors (capital and
labor inputs) special to ￿rm j. Firm-speci￿c inputs mean that payments to factor services, and
therefore marginal cost, can di⁄er across ￿rms. Deviations of a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost from the
aggregate in turn re￿ ect di⁄erences in any given ￿rm￿ s output from the output level prevailing on
average across the economy: that is, g MCt(j) = e Yt(j)
1￿￿f
￿f . Relatively high production levels reduce
a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost compared to the economy-wide average. A ￿rm is deterred from raising
its price by the fact that the induced decrease in its demand will rebound on it by reducing its
equilibrium output and raising its marginal cost.
As shown in Levin, L￿pez-Salido, and Yun (2007a), the pro￿t-maximization condition in












The expressions for variables Z1t and Z2t revert to the prototype case because our analysis
has resumed use of the Dixit-Stiglitz standard (i.e.,   = 0). But ￿rm-speci￿c factors introduce
the power 1 + ￿
￿f
1￿￿f into the pricing expression. The optimal price charged by adjusting ￿rms
therefore depends in a concave manner on the expected stream of markups. This concavity is a
manifestation of strategic complementarity. With this concavity, and assuming positive in￿ ation,
￿rms setting prices at time t have incentives to subdue their actions on prices compared to the
baseline, no-real-rigidity case.
As was the case with the kinked-demand modi￿cation, the introduction of ￿xed factors
means a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form (8). The expression for the Calvo-related





: This expression illustrates the strategic-complementarity character of ￿xed inputs.
10The higher the share of ￿xed inputs in production (￿f), the more in￿ ation￿ s response to marginal
cost is suppressed.
3.2 Implications for the steady-state in￿ ation rate
The foregoing results are now illustrated quantitatively. The discount factor used is ￿ = 0.993,
there are log preferences over consumption (￿ = 1), a unit Frisch labor elasticity (1=￿ = 1), and a
production function parameter of ￿ = 0.33. The steady-state markup is set to 16%, corresponding
to ￿ = 7. The money demand parameter value used is ￿ = 11.4, so as to generate an interest
elasticity of money demand in the same ballpark as that in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003).
Our criteria are to generate a Phillips curve slope (￿p￿) of 0.025, in line with time series
estimates of the elasticity of in￿ ation to current real marginal cost. ￿p is ￿xed so as to keep the
implied average interval between a ￿rm￿ s price adjustments to about three quarters, in line with
microeconomic evidence (i.e., ￿ = 0:6, as before). These choices imply ￿ ￿ = 0:1. The model-speci￿c
parameter is ￿xed at a value that ensures this ￿. So   = ￿8 in the case of quasi-kinked demand;
and ￿f = 0.58 in the case of ￿rm-speci￿c inputs.
Figure 2 plots the relationship between the parameters￿ i.e.,   and ￿f￿ that govern each
strategic complementarity, and the corresponding optimal in￿ ation rate. These results refer to
experiments where only a single strategic complementarity is present each time, so a zero value of
the parameter corresponds to the no-real-rigidity case. With no real rigidity present, the Friedman
(1969) rule is close to optimal and 2.5% de￿ ation is the optimal steady-state rate. But, irrespec-
tive of which strategic complementarity is considered, introducing the complementarity shifts the
balance in favor of zero in￿ ation, the more so the greater the economic importance of the real
rigidity.
3.3 Optimal policy in the stochastic economy
The second-order approximations of household welfare for the two types of strategic complemen-
tarity analyzed above are derived in Levin, L￿pez-Salido, and Yun (2007a).6 In both cases, the
6To concentrate on the second-order approximation, it is assumed that subsidies have moved the steady-state level
of output to its e¢ cient level. It is also now assumed that the economy has reached the cashless limit.
11assumption of wage ￿ exibility means that real marginal cost has a loglinear relationship with the
output gap: mct = ￿xxt. The coe¢ cient ￿x is also the weight on output-gap ￿ uctuations in the
social welfare function. The constraint faced by an optimizing policymaker can accordingly be writ-
ten as an output-gap New Keynesian Phillips curve, ￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + (￿x￿p￿)xt, which is identical
across the two types of strategic complementarity (other than the de￿nition of potential output









2 ], and so in general terms the period loss func-
tion coincides with that derived for New Keynesian models by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Woodford (2003).
The policymaker￿ s problem is nevertheless distinct across the two cases because the expres-
sion for the in￿ ation-variability weight, ￿￿; depends crucially on which of the two mechanisms is
the source of strategic complementarity. In the kinked-demand setting, the weight is ￿￿ = ￿=￿p;
while this instead becomes ￿￿ = ￿=(￿p￿) in the case of ￿xed factor inputs. With kinked demand,
therefore, in￿ ation optimally exhibits a more powerful response to the movements in the output
gap: the relative weight on in￿ ation variability being lower in the welfare function, more in￿ ation
variability is tolerated to ￿ atten the output gap path. In￿ ation variations are more tolerable in
the kinked-demand-curve case because the approximation of the stochastic economy takes place
in a region where relative-demand reactions (and so equilibrium allocations of resources) are quite
price-insensitive, so the relative-price ￿ uctuations associated with in￿ ation variations become less
costly.
3.4 The cost of in￿ ation in the presence of strategic complementarities
Let us consider the e⁄ect that the type of strategic complementarity has on estimates of the time
series behavior of relative price distortions. As noted above, the framework of Dixit-Stiglitz bundling
and Calvo pricing leads to a relation between the relative price distortion metric and in￿ ation of
the form:








This expression is used to construct time series for the distortions f￿tgT
t=0 given an initial
12value ￿￿1 and observed aggregate U.S. in￿ ation f￿tgT
t=0.7 The initial condition for the distortion






￿￿1: This steady-state value is
obtained using the average in￿ ation rate over our pre-sample observations, 1947:1-1959:4. As
before, ￿ = 0.6 and ￿ = 7 are assumed.
Figure 3 depicts the implied relative price distortion index, for each of the two settings of
strategic complementarity over the quarterly sample 1960:1-2005:3. Relative price distortion rises
in the early 1970s to peak in the middle of the decade. Visually there are similarities with Fischer￿ s
(1982, Fig. 1a) measure of relative price variability, the main di⁄erence being that for Fischer the
early 1980s peak slightly exceeds the mid-1970s peak. Fischer￿ s series ends in the early 1980s; our
longer series show sharp declines in relative price variability after 1982 and low values in the 1990s.
The two distortion measures generated by the alternative real-rigidity models are highly
correlated, but the scale of their variations are di⁄erent. This is a mirror image of the fact that the
speci￿cation of real rigidity impacts signi￿cantly on the welfare implications of price dispersion. In
the model variant with quasi-kinked demand, the period 1965-81 of turbulent and high in￿ ation
generates quantitatively modest levels of ine¢ ciency via relative price dispersion. By contrast,
the case of ￿rm-speci￿c factors yields much higher welfare losses: the relative price distortions
reduce the level of aggregate output by 10 percent or more. Either way, the measure of relative
price distortion depends principally on the in￿ ation level, taking a steady-state value of zero when
long-run average in￿ ation is itself zero.
4 Resolving macroeconometric equivalence using economic data
At this point it is appropriate to consider strategies that might overcome the macroeconometric
equivalence established above, and in so doing determine the underlying economic structure. The
￿rst option considered is that of more intensive use of macroeconomic information, followed by a
discussion of the option of deploying microeconomic data.
7In our loglinear derivations, ￿t denotes the log-di⁄erence in the price level. Our empirical generation of the
relative price distortion index, however, de￿nes ￿t as the percentage change in the price level: ￿t =
Pt￿Pt￿1
Pt￿1 .
134.1 More macroeconomic information
Macroeconomic information that might supplement a standard analysis includes estimates of more
accurate approximations of the macroeconomic model (that is, estimates that use a higher-order
approximation); and additional macroeconomic series. Each of these options is considered below.
As noted in the introduction, econometric techniques are available for breaking macro-
econometric equivalence by estimating systems that approximate the general equilibrium model to
a higher order than the loglinear baseline. But it is doubtful that such methods can in practice be
relied upon to break macroeconometric equivalence.
The equilibrium solution of a loglinearized DSGE model can be cast as a restricted VAR
system. Therefore, the contention that estimation of nonlinear models resolves macroeconometric
equivalence problems amounts to the following claims: that the restrictions on VARs needed to
obtain DSGE models are generally rejected in practice (so that loglinearized DSGE models are not
viable empirically); and/or that nonlinear empirical models signi￿cantly outperform unrestricted
VARs in terms of ￿t (so that unrestricted VARs are too weak a benchmark for structural empirical
models). Neither of these claims seems to have support from the balance of the literature. The
modeling stage seems to have been reached where medium-scale loglinearized DSGE models do
not seem to be rejected as restrictions on VARs. And we are not aware of compelling evidence
that models that are nonlinear (in variables) outperform VARs for the modeling of macroeconomic
series; Sims (1998, p. 939), for example, argues that the ￿best evidence￿is that nonlinearity is ￿of
modest quantitative signi￿cance.￿
Morley and Piger (2006) argue that nonlinear models are needed for reproducing business
cycle regularities. On close inspection, however, Morley and Piger￿ s ￿ndings do not repudiate the
macroeconomic literature￿ s concentration on loglinearized models. For one thing, Morley and Piger
con￿rm that linear models are su¢ cient for capturing the extent of observed output peaks and
troughs, thus suggesting that the local approximations implied by ￿rst-order representations are
not empirically inadequate. Furthermore, the type of nonlinearity Morley and Piger emphasize as
empirically important is the ￿plucking model￿feature that rapid expansions follow deep recessions
14but not shallow recessions. This, however, is a type of regularity that is unlikely to be invariant
to the speci￿cation of the monetary policy rule, and so not a regularity that one would want to
impose on the structure of a general equilibrium model. It is a regularity that may call for a
nonlinear model if one is modeling real GDP as a univariate process (as Morley and Piger do), but
not necessarily if one is modeling in a general equilibrium framework.
It might be argued that the existing literature understates the degree of nonlinearity in the
data because so much of it (both VAR and DSGE) is conditioned on the assumption of a constant
policy regime over the sample period (with perhaps one break allowed in 1979-80), and, with that
assumption, a constant steady-state in￿ ation rate. According to this argument, nonlinear elements
of the model structure might be recovered by using a better, more ￿ exible speci￿cation of the
Federal Reserve￿ s policy rule. Some recent work, while still using loglinearized structural models,
does allow for more changes in monetary policy regime by allowing for a shifting Federal Reserve
in￿ ation target: for example, Ireland (2007), Smets and Wouters (2005), and Cogley and Sbordone
(2008). If nonlinearity in model structure impacted heavily on macroeconomic behavior, then it
is plausible that estimates of the IS and Phillips curve slopes in the loglinearized model would be
highly sensitive to respeci￿cation of the policy rule, since the loglinear approximation in that case
would be very fragile. But to our knowledge none of this work establishes that IS and Phillips curve
slope estimates are dramatically changed by allowing for a policy regime change; indeed, Ireland
(2007) ￿xes the IS and Phillips curve slopes at values obtained in preexisting studies. So allowing
for this form of nonlinearity in the policy rule does not seem to o⁄er an obvious path to determining
the nature of the nonlinearity in private sector structural behavior.
In principle, any variable that depends on expected future in￿ ation or expected future
output is informative about the true structure driving in￿ ation and output. The expectation of
future output depends on the structural parameters in the IS equation, and the expectation of
future in￿ ation depends on the structural parameters in the Phillips curve. But expanding the
macro dataset to include forward-looking indicators (e.g., by including monetary, credit, or wealth
aggregates), and adding the corresponding equilibrium conditions pertaining to these variables,
15will not resolve the equivalence problem. The reason is that the macroeconometric equivalence
means that linear projections of in￿ ation are the same irrespective of model speci￿cation￿ so (e.g.)
the sequence of expected in￿ ation rates {Et￿t+1;Et￿t+2; ...} is identical across the ￿xed-input
and kinked-demand model variants of our model. Therefore, obtaining more precise estimates of
those projections is uninformative for the task of distinguishing between the alternative model
speci￿cations.
It is therefore not clear that exploitation of information from further macroeconomic vari-
ables will resolve macroeconometric equivalence. This leads to our interest in alternative datasets.
For Phillips curve analysis, the key alternative to macroeconomic time series data consists of micro-
level information.
4.2 Microeconomic data
Microeconomic datasets have the potential to resolve Phillips curve equivalence, as they reveal
features of the ￿rm-level problem that are lost in aggregation. For our purposes, the most clear-cut
way to break the Phillips curve equivalence is to establish whether ￿rms face a kinked demand
curve for their product. Kinked demand is associated with only one of the rationalizations of
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and so evidence on demand curvature breaks the equivalence.
Such curvature is governed by a parameter (the individual-good demand elasticity) that cannot
be recovered from the aggregate Phillips curve, but on which relevant microeconometric evidence
exists. Klenow and Willis (2006) come out against Kimball (1995)-type kinked demand curves using
microeconometric tests.8 But a more optimistic conclusion about the realism of kinked demand is
made by Dossche, Heylen, and den Poel (2006), again using micro data (in their case, euro-area
scanner data on both prices and quantities). Dossche, Heylen and den Poel ￿nd, in line with
kinked-demand theory, that price increases trigger proportionately greater demand reactions than
do reductions in price. They caution against curvature of demand of the magnitude used by Kimball
(1995), but see their results as supportive of moderately kinked behavior in goods demand. The
8Traditional kinked-demand curve analysis had been subject to an earlier critique using industry data in Stigler
(1947).
16case study by Levitt (2006), while covering only one ￿rm, is also supportive of the kinked-demand
view that there is a price-inelastic band on the consumer demand curve and that price setting
in practice is such that equilibrium quantities occur in that band. Results such as these suggest
tentatively that kinked demand should be preferred to ￿xed inputs in deriving the Phillips curve,
in order to tie macroeconomic model speci￿cation more closely to microeconomic evidence.
At the same time, though the preceding discussion has cast the issue in terms of the choice
between two alternative speci￿cations of real rigidity, one should always be aware that there is
evidence against both speci￿cations. Still further real rigidities might be contemplated. Further-
more, one could argue that the sensitivity of welfare to these speci￿cation choices, as depicted in
Figures 2 and 3, is too great for either speci￿cation to be credible. Calvo pricing, while a reason-
able approximation in describing observed in￿ ation behavior, might be too major an abstraction
to use in welfare and counterfactual analysis. The extreme costs of in￿ ation that result from its
interaction with the ￿rm-speci￿c-factors environment may be a re￿ ection of stretching the Calvo
framework too far. In that light, an important complement to standard New Keynesian modeling
is the research agenda that applies state-dependent pricing to monetary policy models (as in Dot-
sey, King, and Wolman, 1999) and evaluates Calvo pricing in terms of its ability to approximate
state dependence (see e.g. Dotsey and King, 2005; Basu, 2005; Gertler and Leahy, 2006; Caballero
and Engel, 2007; and Woodford, 2008). Nominal rigidities might also receive stronger foundations
from behavioral theories of ￿rm and consumer behavior (see Rotemberg, 2007). But the bottom
line regarding microeconomic data remains: datasets containing information on individual ￿rms
can help in discriminating between speci￿cations that appear equivalent when using conventional
macroeconomic approaches. Such microeconomic datasets serve as an important discipline on mon-
etary policy analysis, since they can reject proposed explanations for observed time series behavior
that could not be ruled out with macroeconometric tests.
175 Household preferences and the slope of the IS curve
The Euler condition encapsulating household aggregate consumption choice is the basis for the IS
equation used in New Keynesian analysis. But, as Sargent (2007, p. 301) observes, ￿A long list of
empirical failures called puzzles come from applying... that Euler equation. Until we succeed in
getting a consumption-based asset pricing model that works well, the New Keynesian IS curve is
built on sand.￿That is, the nonlinear model typically used to derive the IS function fails to account
for routine ￿nancial market facts. Standard household preference speci￿cations (hereafter called
￿expected utility￿ ) cannot explain the substantial premium priced into risky instruments, and are
hard to reconcile with the variability of long-term asset returns.
Recognizing the weaknesses of the expected-utility speci￿cation, the analysis here exam-
ines the implications for IS curve speci￿cation and optimal monetary policy of Epstein-Zin (1989)
preferences. A further instance of macroeconometric equivalence and microeconomic dissonance
then emerges. To our knowledge, the analysis here amounts to the ￿rst attempt to integrate the
Epstein-Zin preference structure into an otherwise standard sticky-price New Keynesian setup.
The attraction of Epstein-Zin preferences is that they break the simple connection between
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion. Epstein-Zin preferences accordingly might account for the coexistence of key securities market
features (in particular, low real rates on risk-free securities) and key equity market features (notably
the equity premium puzzle), which less ￿ exible preference speci￿cations may ￿nd irreconcilable (see
e.g. Tallarini, 2000; Brevik, 2005).
5.1 Expected utility vs. Epstein-Zin preferences
Compared to the prototype model in Section 2, the model now has two modi￿cations. First, the
production function is specialized to be linear in labor. Second, preferences are extended to take
the Epstein-Zin form. The implications of the extended preference speci￿cation for the household
and ￿rm problems are outlined below.
18Household￿ s preferences are de￿ned in a recursive way as:
Ut = Vt +
￿
￿






1+’0 . This speci￿cation corresponds to Tallarini￿ s (2000), albeit augmented with
a real-balance term. This speci￿cation imposes a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption, while ’ governs relative risk aversion. As ’ ! 1, preferences approach the expected-
utility case. When ’ > 1, the household is more risk averse than in the expected-utility case (i.e.,
the exp(￿Ut+1) term raises risk aversion for an unchanged degree of intertemporal substitution). In
such an environment, agents have a greater inherent desire for a steady and predictable evolution
of consumption. The opposite set of desires holds for ’ < 1. Because of the distinction between
period utility Ut and its standard component Vt, it is convenient for the household optimization
problem to have a Lagrange multiplier with which to carry the de￿nition of Ut; this multiplier
is denoted ￿t. As will become clear below, this Lagrange multiplier captures the impact of risk
aversion on consumer behavior in the nonlinear model.











Nt + Dt ￿ Tt; (13)
where Bt+1 denotes a portfolio of nominal claims on the complete contingent claims market, Qt;t+1
the stochastic discount factor, Wt the nominal wage, Tt a real lump-sum tax, and Dt real dividend
income.












This condition indicates that, notwithstanding logarithmic preferences, the parameter ￿ matters
for consumption growth and the real interest rate in the nonlinear model. In the loglinearized
economy, however, this condition delivers a standard IS equation,
^ yt = Et[^ yt+1] ￿ ( ^ Rt ￿ Et^ ￿t+1);
19so that Epstein-Zin preferences and standard preferences are macroeconometrically equivalent in
their implications for the IS equation, with the preceding expression corresponding to equation (3)
with unit slope.
Epstein-Zin preferences also matter for price-setting choices (which, as before, are subject






















These expressions re￿ ect the impact that Calvo impediments to price changes have in the
world of Epstein-Zin preferences. Calvo price stickiness is particularly burdensome on agents in this
environment. Firms are owned by and serve to maximize pro￿ts for households with Epstein-Zin
preferences, and Calvo pricing produces a type of inde￿nite uncertainty that is penalized heavily
by this preference structure. While probabilities can be assigned to the date at which ￿rms will
be permitted to readjust prices, no date can be speci￿ed with certainty, and the protracted lack of
resolution of uncertainty means a loss of utility. The ratio of exponents in the pricing expressions is
the adjustment that ￿rms make to their price-setting plans to compensate for the protracted period
of risk. Nevertheless, the model with Epstein-Zin preferences does produce, when loglinearized near
the steady state, a pricing equation that is the same as the prototypical New Keynesian Phillips
curve; details of this derivation are provided in our Technical Appendix.
5.2 Implications for optimal monetary policy
Let us now consider optimal monetary policy under commitment. Uhlig (2006) describes the
Ramsey program in a ￿ exible-price economy characterized by Epstein-Zin preferences, and this
program can be adapted to monetary policy analysis and to the presence of price stickiness by
drawing on the techniques described in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003).
The focus here is on the case where ￿scal policy (speci￿cally, a subsidy to ￿rms) is not used
to o⁄set the distortion associated with monopolistic competition in goods market. The ￿rst-best
20allocation is therefore not an option, even in steady state. Furthermore, as noted above, unexpected
changes in utility ￿ ows enter ￿rms￿discount-factor expression, and so a⁄ect pricing decisions when
the price is likely to remain ￿xed for several periods. This externality, which is transmitted from the
￿nancial market to goods markets, needs to be internalized by the Ramsey planner. This element
of the problem, absent in the expected-utility world, can materially a⁄ect optimal in￿ ation and the
desired output gap path.
In this connection, it is worth drawing attention to the role of the de￿nition of Ut as a
constraint on optimal policy under Epstein-Zin preferences. Let ~ ￿t denote the Lagrange multiplier
on this constraint in the Ramsey program. If ~ ￿t = 0 for all t, the constraint is not binding;
maximizing the intertemporal stream of Ut involves the same policy as maximizing the intertemporal
stream of standard expected utility Vt; and Epstein-Zin preferences have no material impact on
monetary policy design. On the other hand, if in general ~ ￿t is nonzero, the constraint binds and the
replacement of standard preferences by Epstein-Zin preferences has a bearing on optimal monetary
policy. With this in mind, it is appropriate to proceed to our results for optimal monetary policy
in the Epstein-Zin utility framework.9
There is no microeconomic dissonance with respect to long-run policy. That is, in the
deterministic steady state, the optimal in￿ ation rate is the same across the worlds of expected
utility and Epstein-Zin utility. Let the technology shock take the value At = 1 for t = 0, 1, ￿￿￿, 1.
With no shocks in the economy, there is no call for compensation for risk, so
exp(￿Ut+1)
Et[exp(￿Ut+1)] = 1 for t
= 0, 1, ￿￿￿, 1. This in turn implies that ~ ￿t = 1 for t = 0, 1, ￿￿￿, 1; i.e., the constraint that de￿nes
Epstein-Zin utility binds but leaves other equilibrium conditions unaltered. The nonlinear Euler
equation is therefore the same across expected-utility and Epstein-Zin cases in the long run; and
with parallel optimality conditions across the two preference settings, optimal steady-state in￿ ation
rates are also identical.
By contrast, di⁄erences with the expected-utility case quickly emerge when loglinear dynam-
ics of the stochastic economy under optimal policy are considered. While the loglinear IS equations
9A more detailed analysis appears in Levin, L￿pez-Salido, and Yun (2007b) and in the Technical Appendix that
supplements the present paper.
21coincide across the expected-utility and Epstein-Zin worlds, the welfare function does not, and so
the social planner￿ s ￿rst-order conditions that help determine aggregate dynamics di⁄er across the
two cases.
There being no subsidy, the planner￿ s optimality conditions are loglinearized near a steady
state which is distorted by monopolistic competition, and which therefore does not correspond to
the e¢ cient allocation. Money holdings are now assumed absent; the monetary-frictions rationale
for deviating from zero in￿ ation is therefore taken o⁄ the table, so simplifying the analysis of the
￿rst-order dynamics of optimal policy.
Parameter choices follow Tallarini (2000), who simulated with a risk-aversion parameter
set, ’: (1, 10, 25, 100). ￿ is set at 0.9926, ’ at 10, and ’0 = 2.99 as a benchmark parame-
terization. In addition, the logarithm of aggregate labor (and total factor) productivity follows
logAt = 0:95logAt￿1 + ￿t, where ￿t is i.i.d. white noise. As Tallarini (2000) shows, the relative
risk-aversion coe¢ cient with the form of Epstein-Zin utility speci￿ed above is (’ + ’0)=(1 + ’0).
This implies a relative risk-aversion coe¢ cient of 1.0 if expected-utility preferences are used, but
3.26 with Epstein-Zin preferences￿ so there is more relative risk aversion in the latter case.
The Lagrange multiplier for the planner￿ s optimization devolves to a constant when prefer-
ences are described by expected utility. Thus, the di⁄erence between expected-utility and Epstein-
Zin preferences is that with the expected-utility formulation the Lagrange multiplier is zero when
expressed as a log-deviation from its steady-state value￿ that is, ^ ￿t = 0 for t = 1, ￿￿￿, 1￿ while
under Epstein-Zin preferences it can ￿ uctuate.
Figure 4 compares optimal policy under Epstein-Zin preferences with that under expected
utility, as re￿ ected in dynamic responses of output and in￿ ation to an exogenous rise in productivity.
Under expected utility, the optimal policy keeps in￿ ation constant while the path of output tracks
its ￿ exible-price trajectory. In contrast, Epstein-Zin preferences imply that social welfare depends
on the volatility of aggregate output, not just on the variances of the output gap and the in￿ ation
rate. Thus, the optimal policy response to the positive productivity shock is signi￿cantly tighter
and thereby reduces its initial impact on the level of output, albeit at the cost of a small and
22transitory de￿ ation.
We have shown that, up to a ￿rst-order approximation, the optimal monetary policy re-
sponse to stationary technology shocks is a⁄ected by the imposition of Epstein-Zin preferences.
This result must be quali￿ed by observing that, had a subsidy been available to o⁄set the steady-
state monopoly distortion, the adoption of Epstein-Zin preferences would not have produced any
di⁄erence (up to ￿rst order) in optimal monetary policy.
6 Resolving macroeconometric equivalence using ￿nancial data
Clearly, the alternatives of expected-utility and Epstein-Zin preferences create another example of
the equivalence/dissonance dilemma for monetary policy design. But ￿nancial data could break IS
equation macro-equivalence. As shown in the previous section, the expected-utility and Epstein-Zin
preference speci￿cations deliver the same IS equation. While the two speci￿cations di⁄er in the
functional form of period utility Ut and so of marginal utility UC;t, the loglinear approximations of
marginal utility are identical; and it is the loglinear approximation that matters for the IS equation.
Determining empirically the appropriate preference speci￿cation requires exploring cases where the
higher-order approximations of UC;t matter materially for data outcomes. But, as noted above, the
di¢ culty in uncovering nonlinear structure in aggregate macroeconomic dynamics rules out macro
series as a likely source of such cases.
Instead, ￿nancial data may be better candidates, since the ￿nance literature is replete with
cases where asset price behavior is related to functions of Ut and where higher-order terms (e.g.,
consumption volatility) impact signi￿cantly on data. These ￿nancial-economics experiments do
not fall into the category of macroeconomic applications, either because the data are sampled so
frequently (as with daily data) that observations on most macroeconomic series are unavailable,
or because the hypotheses are conditional on assumed exogenous processes for series that would
be explained endogenously in a macroeconomic application. Yet, by isolating testable empirical
implications of nonlinearities, these exercises can help macroeconomists decide between di⁄erent
speci￿cations of macroeconomic structure. Higher-order properties of models, despite their subdued
23impact on macroeconomic time series dynamics, are an important source of ￿nancial market dy-
namics. For this reason, from positive-economics studies of ￿nancial data we can glean information
necessary for accurate welfare calculations in normative macroeconomic applications.
A major example of an attempt to discriminate between Epstein-Zin and standard prefer-
ences in an empirical ￿nancial economics context is Bansal and Yaron (2004). Bansal and Yaron
use monthly data, but theirs is a ￿nancial rather than macroeconomic study: the consumption
equation consists of a univariate law of motion. Bansal and Yaron thus treat consumption growth
as an exogenous state variable (rather than the endogenous variable it would be in macroeconomic
applications) and use the nonlinear Euler equation (vs. the use of the loglinearized version in
macroeconomics). Bansal and Yaron derive the implications for asset market behavior that arise
jointly from Epstein-Zin preferences and their assumed law of motion for consumption. They con-
clude that these can account for ￿the observed magnitudes of the equity premium, the risk-free
rate, and the volatility of the market return, dividend yield and the risk-free rate￿(2004, p. 1502).
Bansal (2007, p. 297) provides a catalogue of further empirical strengths of this model, arguing
that it or close variants can account for nominal yield curve and foreign exchange behavior.
The existing literature clearly puts forward some empirical advantages of Epstein-Zin pref-
erences over the expected-utility baseline, and therefore reasons for favoring Epstein-Zin in deriving
the IS curve. A further simple illustration of the power of ￿nancial data to test macroeconomic
models is now provided, focusing on real yield curve behavior. This example reinforces the message
that the alternative preference speci￿cations studied here imply sharply di⁄erent implications for
￿nancial behavior, while also bringing out some empirical limitations of both speci￿cations.
The slope of the real yield curve is a central regularity with which to test the relative merits
of Epstein-Zin and expected-utility preference speci￿cations. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) estab-
lish, in a model without production, that Epstein-Zin preferences are associated with a downward-
sloping real yield curve￿ a departure from the basically ￿ at implication of expected-utility prefer-
ences for the same intertemporal-substitution elasticity (namely, unity). On the basis of this result,
it would seem that the di⁄erent term-structure behavior across the two preference speci￿cations
24can be used to resolve equivalence of linearized IS curves in macroeconomic models.
Figure 5(a) plots real yield curve data as predicted by the Bansal-Yaron (2004) model. The
￿gure uses both an intertemporal elasticity of substitution away from unity (Bansal and Yaron￿ s
parameter choice) and an elasticity of unity (in line with the preferences speci￿ed in Section 5).
Bansal and Yaron￿ s parameterization of the consumption process is followed here, but risk aversion
is set to 5.0 when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity and at 15 for the case of a 1.5
intertemporal elasticity. The ￿gure shows that Epstein-Zin preferences predict a downward-sloping
real yield curve irrespective of the degree of intertemporal substitution contemplated.
Figure 5(b) displays average real yield curves, drawn from the indexed bond market, of
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the ￿ve-year period 2003-2007. This covers
a lengthy economic expansion and corresponds to a period over which indexed bond markets were
well established in all three economies (the U.K. market was of long standing; the French market
had adjusted to euro introduction in 1999-2002; and the U.S. market had become much more
liquid).10 French and U.S. real yield curves appear on this evidence to be upward-sloping, while
the UK real yield curve is ￿ at or downward-sloping, in line with Piazzesi and Schneider￿ s (2006)
￿nding that the U.K. real yield curve has a downward slope.
The real yield patterns observed empirically thus contradict both the Epstein-Zin speci￿ca-
tions and the expected-utility speci￿cation because neither speci￿cation predicts the upward-sloping
real yield curves predominant in the data. This example underscores the merits o⁄ered by ￿nancial
data for macroeconomic behavior. Financial data bring out inadequacies of macroeconomic model
speci￿cation that cannot be detected in a macroeconometric study; therefore, such bodies of data
o⁄er powerful tests for models used in monetary policy analysis.
10There are two datasets available for U.S. real yields: the website of J. Huston McCullogh and the U.S. Treasury.
McCullogh interpolated real yield curves from U.S. TIPS data from 1998, while real yields on the U.S. Treasury
website begin in 2003. The Bank of England reports interpolated real yield curves from indexed securities; the
shortest maturity available on a consistent basis is 2.5 years. France￿ s bonds are indexed to the French CPI (source:
Agence France Tresor website); its real yield curve is calculated using the Nelson-Siegel (1987) procedure.
257 Conclusions
The preceding analysis has illustrated the consequences for optimal monetary policy of models
which feature macroeconometric equivalence and microeconomic dissonance. Alternative versions
of a small New Keynesian model were presented that are isomorphic in their implied linearized
macroeconomic dynamics, but whose underlying microeconomic di⁄erences return to the surface
when welfare in the fully nonlinear model is analyzed. It was shown that optimal monetary policy
is sensitive to the speci￿cation of economic structure even when the speci￿cations are equivalent
in their implications for the slope parameters of the IS and Phillips curves. The welfare di⁄er-
ences across speci￿cations are manifested in variations in period-by-period optimal policy in the
stochastic economies and in di⁄erent optimal steady-state in￿ ation rates. Our conclusion is that
macroeconomic applications are unlikely to break the equivalence, even those deploying nonlinear
estimation methods. But ￿nancial data can break the equivalence by determining the nonlinear
structure of household preferences and so revealing the underpinnings of the IS equation. Likewise,
microeconomic data are revealing about Phillips curve structure because they shed light on aspects
of the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem that are aggregated out of macroeconomic data. Together,
these alternative datasets serve as an important discipline on monetary policy analysis, as they can
deliver empirical rejections of models whose predictions were consistent with the macroeconomic
data.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Dixit-Stiglitz and Quasi-Kinked Demand Curves 
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Figure 2. Optimal Steady-State Inflation Rate: Alternative Sources of Real Rigidity 
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Figure 3. The Welfare Costs of Relative Price Distortions 
Under Alternative Sources of Strategic Complementarity 
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Figure 4. Impulse Response for Technology Shock under Optimal Monetary Policy: 
Epstein-Zin and Expected-Utility Preferences 
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Figure 5. Real Yield Curves across Countries vs. Model Predictions 
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Expected Utility, IES = 1
Epstein−Zin Utility, IES = 1
Epstein−Zin Utility, IES = 1.5
 
 
Note: Figure 5(b) uses the same law of motion for consumption under both expected 
utility and Epstein-Zin utility.  The implied level of the real yield curve will still differ 
across specifications; therefore, the figure rescales the level of the expected-utility curve 
to allow direct comparisons of curvature across expected-utility and Epstein-Zin 
specifications.  